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THE SHADOW OF KIOBEL AND JESNER:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
BRINGING IT BACK INTO THE LIGHT
JEFFREY JAMES GROSHOLZ*
ABSTRACT
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") was enacted in 1789 and for roughly two centuries seemed
fated to go down as a curious historicalfootnote. Invoked only a handful of times over the
ensuing two hundredyears, the ATS had new life breathed into it in 1980 with the Second
Circuit case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. The ATS subsequently became a vehicle for victims of
human rights violations seeking redress in U.S. courts. But while Filartigarepresented a
small window of opportunity opening for human rights activists, this utility would prove
short-lived as the Supreme Court quickly began to curtail the applicabilityof the ATS: first
putting its hand on the window sill with the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, then slamming
it closed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., and finally bolting the lock and throwing
away the key recently in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC. This constant chipping away at the ATS
has sharply limited the circumstancesin which it can be invoked, renderingit virtually toothless.
This Note argues that the Court'sinterpretationsof the ATSpost-Sosa is both flawed and
at odds with its underlying intent. It will contrast the workable standard laid out by the Sosa
Court with the subsequent brittle constructions of the Kiobel and Jesner Courts. This Note
posits that the standard imposed by the Court in Sosa is best interpreted using Justice
Breyer's concurrencefrom Kiobel and Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Jesner and calls for the
adoption of a synthesis of these as the best interpretationof the ATS going forward. Specifically, this hybrid test interprets the first prong of Sosa through Justice Sotomayor's Jesner
dissent and relies on customary international law to inform courts as to what recognized
norms are. It interprets the secondprong of Sosa through Justice Breyer's Kiobel concurrence
and allows courts to use their discretion in determining whether enforcement of these norms
is appropriate,viz, does it concern distinct American interests. This Note will show that this
hybrid test is an appropriatelyconstrainedinterpretationof the ATS based on its text, history,
and intent, and will also apply this hybrid test to two recent cases to demonstrate its viability
and applicability in practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") is a one-sentence law enacted in
1789.2 Despite its brevity, untold pages have been spent attempting to
decipher its meaning.3 After its passage, the ATS was invoked only a
handful of times prior to 1980.4 This changed with the Second Circuit
decision Filartigav. Pena-Irala.
In its holding, the Second Circuit declared that the ATS "open[ed]
the federal courts [to] adjudication of the rights already recognized by
international law." 6 In so doing, the Second Circuit offered up the ATS
as a vehicle of redress for human rights violations.7 But whatever window of opportunity opened by Filartigawas short-lived, as the Supreme Court slowly and consistently foreclosed the utility of the ATS.
Beginning in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain8 wherein the Court first put
its hand on the window sill to proscribe the ATS as only encompassing
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)).
3. See generally, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation after
2.

&

Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749 (2014) (arguing that post-Kiobel human rights litigants
should stop seeking relief under the ATS and look elsewhere); Anthony J. Bellia Jr.
Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445
(2011) (arguing the ATS was improperly interpreted in Filartigaand its progeny as well as

in Sosa); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionalityof the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687 (2002) (hereinafter referred to as Dodge II)
(arguing that the ATS was intended to be purely jurisdictional, that Congress did not mean
to limits its jurisdiction solely to suits against U.S. citizens, and that the law of nations is
part of the "Laws of the United States" per Article III); Curtis A Bradley, The Alien Tort
Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002) (arguing that the ATS was not intended
to create a statutory cause of action, that Congress meant to limits its jurisdiction to suits
involving at least one U.S. citizen defendant, and that the law of nations was not encompassed by the "Laws of the United States" per Article III); accord William S. Dodge, The
Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 221 (1996) (hereinafter referred to as Dodge I).
4. See John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal: A PaqueteHabana Approach to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231, 236 (2004) (noting that the
ATS was invoked in "only twenty-one cases" before 1980); see also Anne-Marie Burley, The
Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461,
463 (1989) (" [T]he [ATS] virtually lay fallow for 200 years [after its passage].").
5. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 887.
7. Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991) ("In Filartiga,transnational public law litigants finally found their Brown v. Board
of Education.").
8. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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a "narrow set of violations of the law of nations"9 -next in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 10-in which the Court ruled the ATS does
not apply to extraterritorial violations of the law of nations and effectively slammed the window closed"-and most recently in Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC1 2 -in which the Court's holding that the ATS does not
extend to foreign corporate defendants represents bolting the lock and
throwing away the key.1 3 While some of this narrowing was appropriate, this Note argues that in its recent decisions the Court has gone
too far, robbing the ATS of its intended efficacy.
Given the Supreme Court's current narrow reading of the ATS, it
begs the question what, if any, future role does the ATS have in U.S.
courts? This Note argues that the ATS was incorrectly interpreted in
the cases of Kiobel and Jesner, and it should instead be returned to the
constrained moorings of Sosa,1 4 with Justice Breyer's Kiobel concurrence 1 5 and Justice Sotomayor's Jesner dissent1 6 serving as the logical
outgrowths to the standard first imposed by the Court in Sosa.17 Specifically, it will call for an adoption of a hybrid test interpreting the
first prong of Sosa through Justice Sotomayor's Jesner dissent and the
second prong of Sosa through Justice Breyer's Kiobel concurrence.18
The first prong relies on customary international law to inform courts
as to what recognized norms are. 19 The second prong allows courts to
use their discretion in determining whether enforcement of these
norms is appropriate, viz, does it concern distinct American interests. 2 0 This Note will show that not only is such a reading closer to the
textual and historical foundations of the ATS, 2 1 but that it is also a
9. Id. at 715.
10. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
11. Id. at 117.
12. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
13. Id. at 1403.
14. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (holding that to find jurisdiction under the ATS, federal courts first should not recognize claims "for violations of
any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted[;]" and second that
"the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts").
15. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 127 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
16. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
17. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infra Part VI.B.
20. See infra Part VIA.
21. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring) (noting that "[n]ot content to treat aliens like citizens of a non-forum state,
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workable standard that can be applied to current cases faced by U.S.
courts. 22

This Note proceeds as follows: Part II traces the early history of the
ATS, from its enactment in 1789 to 1980, focusing on how little was
understood about it during this long period of dormancy. Part III looks
at the Filartigadecision, the period between it and the Sosa decision,
and the impact this had on transforming the ATS into a tool for human
rights activists seeking redress. Part IV examines the Sosa decision
and discusses the narrowly proscribed definition it gave to the ATS.
Part V looks at the Kiobel and Jesner decisions, comparing the majority opinion to Justice Breyer's concurrence for the former and Justice
Sotomayor's dissent for the latter. Part VI will argue that the ATS was
properly interpreted in Sosa-as succinctly restated in Justice
Breyer's Kiobel concurrence-and that Justice Breyer's Kiobel concurrence and Justice Sotomayor's Jesner dissent can be fused to create a
hybrid approach to the ATS. Part VII will focus on two cases that are
recent as of this writing: Rukoro v. FederalRepublic of Germany in the
Southern District of New York 23 and the murder of journalist Jamal
Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul. 2 4 These will be
used to show how the hybrid test would work in practice and how this
approach both effectuates the intent of the ATS and also remains in
line with American policy concerns. Part VIII concludes.
II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE ATS: 1789-1980
While much has been written about the ATS, its original meaning
has never been fully settled, 25 thus creating a gap in what the first
Congress truly intended of the ATS. 2 6 As Judge Friendly once stated,
the ATS is "a kind of legal Lohengrin.... [N]o one seems to know

the drafters [of the ATS] also gave district courts concurrent original jurisdiction" when an
alien sued for a violation of the law of the nations).
22. See infra Part VII.
23. Rukorov. Federal Republic of Germany, 363 F. Supp. 3d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (hereinafter referred to as Rukoro I), appeal filed, Rukoro v. Federal Republic of Germany, No.
19-609. (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2019) (hereinafter referred to as Rukoro II).
24. Shane Harris, Greg Miller, & Josh Dawsey, CIA Concludes Saudi Crown Prince
Ordered Jamal Khashoggi's Assassination, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-concludes-saudi-crown-princeordered-jamal-khashoggis-assassination/2018/11/16/98c89fe6-e9b2-1 1e8-a9399469f1 166f9d-story.html.
25. Burley, supra note 4, at 463 ("[D]efinitive proof of the intended purpose and scope
of the [ATS] is impossible.").
26. This is partly due to a lack of specific materials from the eighteenth century regarding the impetus for the ATS. See generally Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 3, at 445.
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whence it came." 27 Part of the confusion behind the ATS is the text
itself. While it specifies that it applies to torts committed against aliens, it notably does not specify whether it can be used against aliens
and citizens alike. 2 8 There is solid evidence that the drafters of the ATS
were partially motivated by a concern for dragging the nascent United
States into an international conflict arising from mistreatment of an
alien by a U.S. citizen. 29 Another source of confusion comes from the
legal term of art "law of nations."3 0 Overall, the closest that exists resembling a consensus is that the ATS was a way of "show[ing] European powers that the new nation [of the United States] would not tolerate flagrant violations of the 'law of nations,' especially when victims
were foreign ambassadors or merchants."3 1
Originally, the language of the ATS gave the district courts "cognizance" of certain causes of action, which courts interpreted to mean it
spoke only to a grant of jurisdiction, rather than creating a substantive
cause of action.3 2 In Sosa, however, the Supreme Court conceded that
based on historical materials, the statute's jurisdictional grant "is best
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
27. IITv. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Lohengrin was an Arthurian
knight who refused to reveal his identity. See, e.g., R. Wagner, Lohengrin, LIBRETTOS OF THE
WAGNER OPERAS 68 (Avenel Books ed. 1980).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 3, at 447.
29. See, e.g., John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals Violate InternationalLaw, 21VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 47, 47 (1988). It is also apparent that Alexander
Hamilton envisioned the federal judiciary as having alienage jurisdiction, although the Judiciary Act did not fully enact Hamilton's vision. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander
Hamilton) (" [T]he federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned."). Others have argued that some drafters of the First
Judiciary Act similarly saw the alienage clause of Article III to grant the federal courts jurisdiction between aliens. See William R. Casto, The Federal Court's Protective Jurisdiction
over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 515 (1986).
30. Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 3, at 447; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("We confront at every turn
broad and novel questions about the definition and application of the 'law of nations.'").
31. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 3 (2003). This concern over the protection of ambassadors and
merchants can be traced to two early incidents in which diplomats were assaulted, namely
the well-publicized "Marbois Affair." See Haberstroh, supranote 4, at 239; see also Dodge II,
supra note 3, at 694 ("On May 17, 1784, the Chevalier De Longchamps threatened the French
Consul General, Francis Barbe Marbois, in the home of the French Ambassador. Two days
later, De Longchamps assaulted Marbois on a Philadelphia street."). De Longchamps was
ultimately convicted in Pennsylvania Supreme Court for violating the law of nations. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (1784).
32. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 713 n.10 (2004).
As understood when it was enacted in 1789, the word "cognizance" was a legal term of art
meaning a court's power to try a case. See Casto, supra note 29, at 479.
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time."33 Based on historical materials considered by the Court,34 the
law of nations as defined by the ATS was thought to encompass three
torts which corresponded to Blackstone's three primary offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.35
A main reason behind the lack of understanding of the ATS is that
36
federal courts had few chances to study it prior to Filartiga.
One instructive early case is Bolchos v. Darrel, which involved an American
citizen, Darrel, seizing a Spanish ship that had been captured by a
French Privateer, Bolchos.37 Bolchos sued Darrel in admiralty for the
cargo of the ship, namely the slaves on board.3 8 While the court ultimately concluded that the case could be resolved under admiralty law,
it noted that, in the alternative, it would have jurisdiction over the suit
arising under the ATS. 3 9 After the Bolchos decision, courts rarely had
opportunities to examine the ATS, as it was invoked only sparingly
over the next 167 years. 4 0 Jurisdiction was upheld under the ATS in
only two reported cases. 4 1 It was not until Filartigain 1980 that this
statutory also-ran was given new life. 4 2

.

33. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. There is also evidence from the time of the ATS's enactment
that it was viewed not simply as a jurisdictional grant but as also providing a cause of action.
See, e.g., 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795) (" [T]here can be no doubt that [a company of British
soldiers] or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a
civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts
in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only .. . such a suit may be maintained by evidence
taken at a distance, on a commission issued for that purpose . . . ."); see also 26 Op. Att'y
Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907) (opining that injured Mexican citizens at the U.S.-Mexican border
could sue under the ATS since it provided both jurisdiction and a cause of action).
34. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
35. Id. at 724.
36. See Bellia & Bradford, supra note 3, at 458-59; Bradley, supra note 3, at 588 ("The
obscurity of the [ATS] ended in 1980 ... with ... Filartiga..
37. 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586
F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1978); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc.,
475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973); Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49
(2d Cir. 1960); Trans-Cont'l lnv. Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565
(C.D. Cal. 1980); Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Valanga v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 33 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
41. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-66 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas.
810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
42 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[W]e believe it is sufficient
here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as
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III. FROM FILARTIGA To SOSA: 1980-2004
In 1980, the Filartigas, Paraguayan citizens living in America,
brought suit against a fellow Paraguayan, Americo Norberto
Pena-Irala, for actions Pena-Irala allegedly committed while serving
the government of Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner. 43 The
Filartigas contended that Pena-Irala kidnapped and tortured a member of their family until he died. 4 4 The Filartigas presented evidence
from three different independent autopsies to support their claim that
the deceased died as a result of professional torture. 45 Pena-Irala
moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
forum non conveniens.46 The district court agreed with Pena-Irala and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 47
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit held that the federal court
did in fact have jurisdiction over the claims made by the Filartigas. 4 8
The Second Circuit reasoned that torture had, by that time, become
recognized as a violation of customary international law, and was
therefore a violation of the law of nations. 4 9 As such, a violation of the
law of nations was found to arise under the laws of the United States
for Article III purposes as the law of nations "forms an integral part of
the common law, and a review of the history surrounding the adoption
of the Constitution demonstrates that it became a part of the common
law of the United States upon the adoption of the Constitution." 0
Filartigarepresented a departure from how the ATS was previously
viewed, and subsequent cases saw other circuits come to similar conclusions as the Second Circuit." However, even as plaintiffs successfully won jurisdictional arguments under the ATS, the question remained of what kinds of suits were allowed under the statute, and
whether it even functioned as a substantive cause of action or if it was
opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international
law.").
43. Id. at 878.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 879.
47. Id. at 880.
48. Id. at 889.
49. Id. at 884.
50. Id. at 886.
51. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); see Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks,

Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 466 n. 16, 467 n.20 (1997) (listing first the extensive scholarship
produced in response to Filartiga and then the scholarship rebuking Judge Bork's
concurrence from Tel-Oren).
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purely jurisdictional.5 2 While the Second Circuit took a broad approach
and allowed aliens to sue other aliens for a large number of claims,5
the D.C. Circuit remained skeptical of the ATS and construed it narrowly.5 4
While the courts struggled to adapt to a post-Filartigaworld, scholars similarly tried to keep up and found themselves coming to no more
agreement than the courts." The broad approach favored the idea that
the ATS created a federal cause of action and thus fell under federal
question jurisdiction, by relying on Filartiga'sreasoning that the law
of nations was a form of federal common law. 6 The narrow view was
that the ATS was purely jurisdictional in scope and thus created no
separate federal cause of action.5 7
Partially in response to this unease, Congress enacted the Torture
Victim Prevention Act of 1991 (TVPA).18 The TVPA was intended to
eliminate the ambiguity in the ATS and give a federal cause of action
to individuals, including aliens, for acts of torture committed under
the color of law of a foreign sovereign. 9 Unfortunately, the TVPA did
not solve the problem of interpreting the ATS, and it was not until the
Sosa decision that the Supreme Court finally weighed in to provide the
lower courts some guidance.6 0
52. See Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 3, at 461. Compare Dodge II, supra note 3, at 71011 (arguing that a violation of the law of nations is encompassed within the federal common
law and thus the ATS created a cause of action), with Curtis A Bradley, Jack L.
Goldsmith, & David H. Moore, SOSA, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 887-88 (2007) (arguing that the ATS was purely
jurisdictional and created no cause of action).
53. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
54. See Al Odahv. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
55. Compare Michael Ratner & Beth Stephens, Tyrants, Terrorists, and Torturers
Brought to Justice: U.S. Courts Provide Compensation for Victim, N.Y. L.J., May 15, 1995,
at S5 (rejecting Judge Bork's Tel-Oren concurrence), with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The CurrentIllegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 319 (1997) (arguing Filartigarested upon flawed assumptions).
56. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 51, at 480; Dodge II, supra note 3, at 710.
57. See Dodge II, supra note 3, at 689-90; Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 52,
at 887-88.
58. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
59. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 2-5 (1991) (explaining the need for a clearly
granted private right of action to avoid the problems of the ATS); see generally Philip Mariani,
Assessing the ProperRelationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Prevention Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2008) ("The TVPA creates an explicit cause of
action for a narrow set of conduct, precisely defines that conduct, and details the manner in
which that cause of action must be pursued. In short, it lacks the fundamental ambiguity
that characterizes the ATS.").
60. See Sosav. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) ("In sum, we think [the ATS]
was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain
cases concerned with a certain subject."). The Court then explained that the ATS, though "a
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IV. SOSA AND ITS IMPACT: 2004-2013

Sosa represented the first time the Supreme Court directly addressed the ATS. 6 1 The case involved a Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") agent who had been captured, interrogated, tortured, and
eventually murdered in Guadalajara, Mexico. 6 2 Fellow DEA agents
came to believe that Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician,
was present during these events and used his skills to keep the captured DEA agent alive in order to extend the interrogation and torture. 63 Alvarez-Machain was abducted in Mexico through joint efforts
between the DEA and Mexican nationals, one of whom was Jose Francisco Sosa, and brought to the United States to stand trial.6 4 AlvarezMachain eventually prevailed on a motion for a judgment of acquittal,
and subsequently brought civil suits against a number of individuals,
including Sosa, under both the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") and
the ATS. 6 1
At trial, Alvarez-Machain was awarded $25,000 in damages on his
ATS claim against Sosa, which was upheld by the Ninth Circuit.66 On
appeal at the Supreme Court, the Court considered the scope of both
the FTCA and ATS, and ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. 67 The Court's ATS holding attempted to define the parameters of
the statute while also contextualizing it for the twenty-first century.68
One of the main holdings by the Court in Sosa was that the ATS
was jurisdictional in nature; however, at the same time the Court also
held that requiring a separate statute upon which to claim relief would
result in the ATS being "stillborn."69 The Court based this on a historical analysis which concluded that "the First Congress did not pass the
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by
a future Congress . . . that might, someday, authorize the creation of
causes of action or itself decide to make some element of the law of
nations actionable for . . . foreigners."70

jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action" was enacted with the intent that the
common law, namely the law of nations, would provide a limited number of offenses that one
could be found personally liable under. Id. at 724.
61. See Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 3, at 462.
62. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 697-98.
65. Id. at 698.
66. Id. at 699.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 714.
70. Id. at 719.

1018

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1009

The Court determined that as a result, the ATS would have been
meant to have "a practical effect." That said, the Court rejected the
broader interpretations of actionable claims available under the ATS,
and instead narrowly defined the law of nations referred to within as
most likely a reference to the limited set of violations that Blackstone
saw as "admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in international affairs."7 2 Thus, the law of
nations as envisioned by the ATS covered violations of safe conduct,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.7 3
The other main ATS holding from Sosa was that any modern claim
made under the statute must "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms" recognized by
the courts.7 4 In plain terms this created a two-prong test: first, it meant
that any new causes of action under the ATS must in some way be
analogous to the three violations proscribed at the time of its passage
in 1789." Second, in deciding whether a claim is analogous, courts
were to employ "a restrained conception of . . discretion."7 6 The Court
held such discretion was necessary because it was "general practice . .
to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority
over substantive law."" And in addressing the limited role the ATS
had played up to that point, the Court noted "[i]t would be remarkable
to take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries." 8 Under

71. Id.
72. Id. at 715.
73. Id.; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67, *68.
74. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
75. Id. at 732; cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before himhostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the ATS's reach
should be defined by "a handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal, and obligatory norms"); see also Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 53, 90 (1981) (listing genocide, summary execution, torture, and slavery as "core human rights violations").
76. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725; see also id. at 732 ("This limit upon judicial recognition is
generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue
before it reached this Court.").
77. Id. at 726.
78. Id. The Sosa Court was keenly aware of the need for restraint in interpreting the
ATS, given what it called "the poverty of drafting history," and that "despite considerable
scholarly attention . . . a consensus understanding of what Congress intended [when enacting the ATS] has proven elusive." Id. at 718-19. Thus, in creating its analysis, the Court
sought to preserve the separation of powers while also furthering what it viewed as Congress'

2019]

THE SHADOW OFKIOBEL AND JESNER

1019

this analysis, the Court determined that Alvarez-Machain's claim for
arbitrary arrest failed as a modern analogue and therefore had no
shelter in the ATS. 7 9

Decided in 2004, Sosa came to be the lodestar by which courts interpreted the ATS going forward.o80 By incorporating much of the
Filartigaholding while also giving a definite set of violations to work
with, the Court was able to lay down defined, narrow parameters for
the ATS's boundaries.8 1 While the Court was unanimous in its holding
regarding the three historical violations that were sufficiently definite
to be actionable under the ATS, it splintered as to whether new violations could become accepted enough under international law to also be
sufficiently definite to be seen as violations of the law of nations. 82 This
lack of consensus as to what, if any, new violations were viable under
the ATS would prove to be a recurring theme in the Court's ATS jurisprudence. 83 Aside from what claims were actionable, another persistent question was who qualified as a valid entity for these claims to be
brought against. 8 4 It was not until the Court took up the cases of Kiobel
and Jesner that some clarity was provided.
V. KIOBEL AND JESNER: 2013-2018

A.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.

Post-Sosa, the Court next took a serious look at the ATS in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. in 2013.85 The case involved Nigerian
nationals who lived in the United States and brought suit against foreign corporations.86 The petitioners claimed that these corporations

intent that "federal courts could properly identify some international norms as enforceable
in the exercise of § 1350 jurisdiction." Id. at 730.
79. Id. at 736-37.
80. See Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 314-15 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014).

8 1. Id.
82. See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
83. Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 3, at 463-64 (explaining how the Court rejected Justice Scalia's position that the ATS permitted no new claims for violations of modern customary international law while also conceding that the ATS would only recognize "a narrow class
of international norms today") (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729).
84. See id. at 464 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724) ("The Court did not directly address the
Article III basis for subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims. The Court simply stated
several times that the ATS is solely a jurisdictional statute that creates no federal cause of
action."). The Court also neglected to determine the scope of claims encompassed by the ATS,
viz, whether it covered claims arising in foreign nations. Id.

85.

569 U.S. 108 (2013).

86.

Id. at 111-12.
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aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing alleged violations of the law of nations. 87
In examining the case, the Court sought to determine whether the
ATS could be applied extraterritorially, that is, whether federal courts
could recognize causes of action under the ATS for violations which
occurred in foreign sovereign territory.8 8 The Court ultimately held
that the ATS was subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality,8 9 as the text of the ATS was silent as to whether it should be applied extraterritorially or not.90 As a result, the Court determined that
"[t]he principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS."9 1
Kiobel represented a major retraction of the interpretation of the
ATS compared to Filartiga,namely an about-face of the availability of
federal courts to hear international human rights cases. 92 While postFilartigacases tended to result in favorable decisions for human rights
activists, Kiobel was nothing less than an unequivocal victory for those
who had become the common targets of these suits, namely foreign
corporate entities. 93 The academic reaction to Kiobel was predictably
split, depending on whether one was inclined to support a more protectionist view of corporate entities versus a more aggressive human
rights advocacy. 9 4 Regardless of where one stood on the merits of the
decision, practically, Kiobel meant that the ATS could now only be
used against parties whose conduct "touch[ed] and concern[ed] the territory of the United States," and even then, that conduct must have

87. Id. at 112.
88. Id. at 112-113.
89 See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) ("When a statute gives
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.").
90. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 118.
91. Id. at 117.
92. David P. Stewart & Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 Am. J. INT'L L. 601, 603 (2013) ("Going forward,
if courts apply a strong version of the presumption and only permit claims based on conduct
in the United States allegedly in violation of a norm of international law that meets the Sosa
standard, then ATS litigation as we know it today is effectively dead. . . .").
93. Id. Many declared Kiobel as the death knell of the ATS. See e.g., Roger Alford, Kiobel
Insta-Symposium: The Death of the ATS and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation,
OPINIO JURIS, (Apr. 17, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-theats-and-the-rise-of-transnational-tort-litigation/. But see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to 'ForeignSquared" Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreignsquared-cases/.
94. Compare Mark Walsh, Global Warning: High Court Limits the Alien Tort Statute
Slowing Suits Against U.S. Companies, 99 A.B.A. J. 17, 17-18 (July 2013), with Anupam
Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel's Unexpected Legacy, 107 Am. J. INT'L
L. 829, 829 (2013).
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had "sufficient [enough] force" to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. 5
Notably, the original appeal in Kiobel was over whether the ATS
could be used against foreign corporations.9 6 The Second Circuit had
held the ATS did not apply to foreign corporations when it decided Kiobel.97 However, the Court instead decided the case on the issue over
whether and under what circumstances the ATS applied to actions occurring outside the United States.98 As a result, the Court did not
reach the original issue of foreign corporate liability. 9 The Court
would finally resolve this uncertainty in the 2018 case Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC. 100
B. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
Jesner was a suit brought by foreign nationals who were either personally injured by or on behalf of those injured by acts of terrorism
committed outside the United States, primarily in the Middle East.o
The petitioners alleged that these acts were aided financially by a Jordanian financial institution, Arab Bank. 1 02 They sought to impose liability on the bank based on the actions of its agents, namely that of
high-ranking executives who allegedly allowed terrorists to use the
bank to transfer funds, which in turn contributed to future acts of terrorism.103
The petitioners sought to overcome Kiobel's presumption against
extraterritoriality by tying some of the financial transactions to Arab
Bank's New York branch. 104 One interesting feature of Jesner is it actually ran concurrent to Kiobel (which spanned roughly thirteen years
total).10 5 The issue the Court initially granted certiorari on in Kiobel-

95. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25.
96. See id. at 114.
97. See Kiobelv. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010); Kiobel,
569 U.S. at 114.
98. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114.
99. See id. ("We granted certiorari to consider [whether the ATS recognizes corporate
liability.] After oral argument, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
an additional question . . . and now affirm the judgment below, based on our answer to the
[additional] question.").
100. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
101. Id. at 1393.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1394.
105. Id. at 1395.
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whether the ATS extended to foreign corporate defendants 1 06-was finally answered in Jesner, with the Court holding that the ATS did not
extend to such entities. 10 7
The Court justified its holding on both historical considerations as
well as a concern for the separation of powers, reasoning that Congress
is better equipped to make such determinations about whether to allow foreign corporations to be held liable under the ATS.10 8 The Court
was also concerned about the attenuated link between the terrorist attacks and the conduct which allegedly occurred within the United
States.' 09 Furthering this point, the Court noted the unique challenges
foreign corporate defendants presented. 10
Recognizing the nation of Jordan as a staunch ally of the United
States, one it relies upon in combatting international terrorism, the
Court was concerned about the diplomatic quagmire an adverse finding would create.' Namely, the Court feared a ratcheting up of tensions between the two sovereigns, especially given the weak link between the conduct and the United States. 1 12 The Court, seemingly both
weary of past litigation and wary of a flood of future litigation brought
against foreign corporate defendants, decided to foreclose such a possibility by narrowly construing the ATS's boundaries.1 1 3 If the ATS had
narrowly survived its encounter with Kiobel, Jesner was the knock-out
punch.
VI.

CALL TO RETURN THE ATS TO ITS SOSA MOORS

This Note's underlying argument is that while in Sosa the Court
took care to define the limitations of the ATS, in Kiobel and Jesner it
treated the ATS as an almost ahistorical scrivener's error. The majority opinions in Kiobel and Jesner gave short shrift to the idea that the
First Congress intended it to apply either extraterritorially or against
foreign corporate defendants. However, a closer examination of those
cases reveals how brittle the Court's post-Sosa interpretation of the
ATS is, and why a return to Sosa's principles is proper.
106 Kiobelv.
107.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013).

Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1408.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 1406.
110. Id. at 1407.
111. Id. at 1406.

112. Id.
113. See id.; see generally id. ("The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law violations ...
where the absence of such a remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States
accountable. But here, and in similar cases, the opposite is occurring.").
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It is important to keep in mind while considering these cases Sosa's
two-step test to determining whether a federal court can recognize a
new cause of action under the ATS. 1 1 4 First, there must be an alleged
violation of an international norm that is definite, specific enough, and
has been accepted by the civilized world.115 Second, the court must use
its discretion in determining whether to recognize such an alleged violation of customary international law. 116
Sosa is an important case for the ATS not only because of the guidance it provided for courts interpreting the ATS going forward, but also
because of the care Justice Souter took in both examining the statute's
history and looking at that history contextually in light of modern
law.117 The Court's decision was both narrow in some senses while
broad in others.1 1 8 It was narrow in the sense that it limited the ATS
to only a small number of violations.1 9 It was simultaneously broad in
that it recognized as laws evolve and change over time, so too will the
law of nations come to recognize new violations that are so definite
they qualify as customary international law. 120 While Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Sosa did not agree with the majority's particular view,
it has been tacitly endorsed by the Court in subsequent cases. 12 1
By comparison, Kiobel looks like the embodiment of the Tipsy
Coachman doctrine come to life. 12 2 While all nine Justices agreed with
114. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 727-28.
117. See id. at 719-20, 724-25.
118. See Alford, supra note 3, at 1752 ("The central holding of Sosa was that the ATS
was a jurisdictional statute that nonetheless permitted common law causes of action for torts
committed in violation" of the law of nations.). Thus, we see the narrowness in holding the
ATS was purely jurisdictional in nature but also its breadth in yielding to the common-sense
wisdom that such a strict reading of the statute would render it toothless on its own. See id.
Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 ("In sum, we think the statute was intended as jurisdictional
in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain causes concerned with a certain subject."), with id. ("[H]istory and practice" support a reading of the ATS allowing "federal courts could entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books, because
torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law
of the time.").
119. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
120. Id.; see also Alford, supra note 3, at 1752 ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa ...
limited the scope of the ATS, but left the door ajar for further litigation . . . .").
121. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring); see, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). The
Sosa holding is a good example of the Court deftly threading the needle by following sound
principles of statutory interpretation while also acceding to the sound judgment that the
First Congress likely would not have intended to write a statute that would be ineffective
without some future, as-yet-unwritten statute coming to its aid. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at
724.
122. The Tipsy Coachman doctrine is one which allows appellate courts to affirm a lower
court's ruling as correct, despite the reasoning being incorrect. See Robertson v. Florida, 829
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the opinion by Chief Justice Roberts dismissing the action (i.e., the
petitioners' claims lacked merit under the ATS), three separate concurrences were filed, all disagreeing on the why behind the dismissal. 1 23 This cacophony of theories repeated itself in Jesner, albeit splitting down more ideological lines with the five more conservative Justices in the majority while the four more liberal Justices dissented. 1 2 4
Justices Alito and Gorsuch filed separate concurrences; Justice Sotomayor, meanwhile, filed a bristling dissent that was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. 1 25 This Note posits that closer inspection of Kiobel and Jesner reveals flawed reasonings, and that the
better interpretations of Sosa can be found in the concurring and dissenting opinions of Kiobel and Jesner. Specifically, it argues that the
first prong of Sosa's test should be viewed through Justice Sotomayor's
dissent from Jesner, and the second prong of Sosa should be viewed
through Justice Breyer's Kiobel concurrence. It will address these in
reverse order for chronological convenience.
A.

DerivingProng Two of Sosa from Kiobel

Looking first at Kiobel, it is interesting to see Justice Kennedy note
with approval that the Court "[left] open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]," calling this
the "proper disposition." 12 6 Justice Kennedy praised the TVPA as helping to address some human rights abuses, but also conceded that instances would almost inevitably arise that neither the TVPA nor the
majority's Kiobel holding would address. 1 27 In such instances, Justice
Kennedy recognized that the presumption against extraterritoriality
would require greater elaboration. 128 It would seem his Jesner opinion
served as the logical next step from this concurrence.
This Note argues the Kiobel concurrence which does the most normative work is Justice Breyer's. Justice Breyer argued he "would not
invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality," but rather find:
[J]urisdiction under [the ATS] where (1) the alleged tort occurs on
American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the

So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002); see also Lee v. Porter, 63 Ga. 345, 346 (Ga. 1879) ("The pupil of
impulse, it forc'd him along, / His conduct still right, with his argument wrong; / Still aiming
at honor, yet fearing to roam, / The coachmen was tipsy, the chariot drove home.") (quoting
OLIVER GOLDSMITH, RETALIATION: A POEM 10 (1774)).
123. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 110.
124. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1393.
125. Id.
126. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.129
Justice Breyer's concurrence fits most neatly in line with the
Court's holding from Sosa, serving as the natural evolution of the principles the Court laid out there (and which he echoed in his own Sosa
concurrence). 130 As Justice Breyer noted, the Court in Sosa laid out "a
framework for answering that question by setting down principles
drawn from international norms and designed to limit ATS claims to
those that are similar in character and specificity to piracy." 131
Where Justice Breyer is most persuasive is in pointing out that the
presumption against extraterritoriality "rests on the perception that
Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign
matters." 1 3 2 However, a look at the text, history, and intent of the ATS
shows why it is a poor fit for this presumption.1 33 Even with the lack of
legislative history surrounding the ATS, 134 one thing most scholars
agree on is it reflected a concern by the First Congress for U.S. entanglement in foreign affairs.1 35 Justice Breyer supports this argument by
pointing out that of the three violations Sosa listed, piracy generally
takes place abroad. 136
Given that piracy almost always occurs abroad, Justice Breyer argues that Sosa's holding actually dictates the opposite of Chief Justice
Roberts' conclusion: by listing piracy as one of the actionable offenses

129. Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 129; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760 (2004) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (noting with approval the Court's holding "that to qualify for recognition under the ATS a norm of international law must have a content as definite as, and an acceptance as widespread as, those that characterized 18th-century international norms prohibiting piracy").
131. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
133. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134. See Warren Richey, When Can Foreigners Sue in US Courts?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2004), https://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0330/p02s02-usju.html)
(referring to Sosa as "The Case of the Inscrutable Statute" due to the lack of historical materials discussing the reasons behind the ATS).
135. See Carolyn A D'Amore, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How
Wide Has the Door to Human Rights Litigations been Left Open, 39 AKRON L. REV. 593, 596
(2006); see also HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 31, at 3 (denoting how the United
States responded to violations against international figures prior to the enactment of the
ATS).
136. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 129-30 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *67, *72 (defining the offense of piracy as a robbery or depredation committed on the high seas that if committed on land would amount to a felony).
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under the ATS, the Sosa Court was explicitly invoking a presumption
for extraterritoriality.1 3 7 As Justice Breyer notes, applying U.S. law to
pirates involves "applying [U.S.] law to acts taking place within the
jurisdiction of another sovereign." 13 8 This is because a ship is like land
in that it falls under the jurisdiction of the flag it sails under. 13 9 Thus,
in applying U.S. law to piracy-even on the high seas-it is an exercise
of power against a foreign sovereign.
This reasoning builds to the most important principle laid out by
Justice Breyer's concurrence: that the ATS should provide jurisdiction
"only where distinct American interests are at issue." 1 4 0 Such a limitation would prevent the United States from becoming the custos morum
of the whole world, 1 4 1 while simultaneously allowing U.S. courts to not
turn away victims of heinous actions contemplated by the ATS. 1 4 2 As
such, this Note contends that in looking at Sosa's second prong regarding judicial discretion, courts should use Justice Breyer's 'distinct
American interests' test to determine whether to find jurisdiction exists under the ATS.
B. DerivingProng One of Sosa from Jesner
The plurality in Jesner determined that foreign corporate entities
could not be liable under the ATS per the first step of Sosa, that is, the
petitioners failed to show "a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of
liability for corporations." 1 43 In deciding there was no norm (and thus
foreign corporate entities would fail the first step of Sosa), the plurality relied heavily on the Second Circuit's opinion from Kiobel which
137. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 129-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21
(1963); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 502 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("[F]lag state has jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to any activity aboard the ship.").
140. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 133 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer interpreted this to
mean circumstances where "(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is
an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind." Id. at 128.
141. Id.; see also United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551) ("No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole
world."); see, e.g., Pettingill v. Dinsmore, 19 F. Cas. 392, 394 (D. Me. 1843) (No. 11,045) (noting a ship captain has authority over his crew to correct mistakes connected with "the due
performance of their special duties on board" the ship, but that he "has not the authority of
a custos morum to correct his crew for general immorality of conduct[]"). Custos morum
means custodian of morals. CustosMorum, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
142. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 133 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
143. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018).
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interpreted a footnote of Sosa to "mean that corporate defendants may
be held liable under the ATS only if there is a specific, universal, and
obligatory norm that corporations are liable for violations of international law." 1 4 4 Such an attenuated link crumbles under scrutiny. The
footnote in question reads:
A related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant
is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.
Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 791-795 (CADC 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture
by private actors violates international law), with
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (CA2 1995)
(sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates international law). 1 4 5
A closer reading of this footnote shows that the Sosa Court was
merely speculating whether international law extends to corporate defendants. It was not making any sort of substantive determination on
the matter. Betraying the weaknesses of its argument, the plurality
concedes that "the enormity of the offenses that can be committed
against persons in violation of international human-rights protections"
can apply to corporations through their human agents. 14 6 And yet, in
the next breath the Court bafflingly holds that the international community has apparently not taken the requisite step of defining a specific, universal, and obligatory norm that corporations are liable for
violations of international law, namely aiding and abetting terrorism.147

The plurality attempts to bolster this argument by analogizing the
ATS to the TVPA and arguing that because the TVPA speaks only to
individuals, not corporations, the Court is precluded from creating a
cause of action here. 1 4 8 But again, the plurality overlooks a key distinction, namely that the TVPA sought to remedy victims of torture,
whereas the ATS's grant of jurisdiction is broader. 149 Returning to
Sosa principles one must ask who are modern pirates, to which the
144. Id.; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010).
145. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
146. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402.

147. Id.
148. Id. at 1403-04.
149. See, e.g., Mariani, supra note 59, at 1393 (quoting S. REP NO. 102-249, at 4-5 (1991)
("[The ATS] has other important uses and should not be replaced [by the TVPA].... [C]laims
based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by [the ATS]. Consequently, the statute should remain intact.")).
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answer is simple: terrorists. 1 0 Individuals who operate without the
color of law, without respect for international law or borders, and who
can be prosecuted by any sovereign which apprehends them.5
An examination of Justice Sotomayor's dissent exposes how the plurality misunderstands Sosa's first step by asking whether it is a "categorical question whether corporations may be sued under the ATS as
a general matter." 15 2 Justice Sotomayor correctly distinguishes the notion that international law offers guidance on what conduct violates
the law of nations (e.g., genocide, slavery, torture, extrajudicial killings)-and how to satisfy Sosa's first prong, there must be international consensus as to the existence of these norms-from the idea that
international law also dictates the enforcement mechanisms for these
norms. 153
As she writes "international law determines what substantive conduct violates the law of nations, [but] it leaves the specific rules of how
to enforce international-law norms and remedy their violation to states,
which may act to impose liability collectively through treaties or independently via their domestic legal systems." 1 54 Justice Sotomayor also
points out that the text of the ATS itself supports this distinction between prohibited conduct and enforcement mechanisms. 155

150. See Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring) ("Civilizational peril comes in many forms-sometimes [as] malevolent philosophies,
sometimes [as] hostis humanisgeneris (pirates, slavers, and now terrorists) . . .") (emphasis
added); Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorismand a New International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 293, 326-27 (2006); Steven R. Swanson,
Terrorism, Piracy, and the Alien Tort Statute, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 159, 213-14 (2008); Douglas
R. Burgess, Jr., Piracy Is Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/opinion/05burgess.html; see also Eileen Rose Pollock, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236, 243 (1982) (discussing the general agreement among sovereign nations of terrorism as a violation of the
law of nations).
151. See, e.g., Swanson, supra note 150, at 213-14 ("Modern terrorists and traditional
pirates share significant similarities... .Pirates and terrorists ... mirror each other in terms
of methodology and mobility. Pirates have always been treated as a special case in the law
because they act beyond the jurisdiction of any one state. Highly mobile, pirates make apprehension difficult and universal jurisdiction appropriate. Like pirates, modern terrorists
live in a world with few boundaries.").
152. Id. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154.

Id.; see, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 111, cmt. h ("In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the
United States to decide how it will carry out its international obligations."); LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 245 (2d ed. 1996)
("International law itself... does not require any particular reaction to violations of law.");
Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between InternationalandNational Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 423 (M. Evans ed. 2006) ("[I]nternational law does not itself prescribe how it should be
applied or enforced at the national level").
155. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Justice Sotomayor's Jesner dissent shows the length to which the
Court has become unmoored from the principles espoused in Sosa. Her
argument in Jesner is a better means of approaching Sosa step one:
when considering whether to recognize a new cause of action under the
ATS and determining whether it is a universal norm of customary international law, courts should note the distinction between what these
norms are versus how they are enforced.1 6
Thus, we have Justice Sotomayor's principle of reliance on customary international law to inform courts as to what norms are recognized,
but then allow courts to use their discretion in determining whether
enforcement of these norms is in line with American interests (using
Justice Breyer's distinct American interests approach). This hybrid
approach would allow for the ATS to have continued efficacy in line
with the First Congress's goal that it be used to avoid foreign entanglements while also holding open the U.S. courts for aliens who have
suffered wrongs.1 5 7
VII. THE TEST IN ACTION
This section will show how the proposed hybrid test is applicable to
two cases that are recent as of this writing-one on appeal after dismissal by the district court, one hypothetical-by running them
through the two-step hybrid test to determine the likely result.
A.

Rukoro v. Federal Republic of Germany1

8

In January 2017, the Ovaherero and Nama peoples (indigenous
peoples hailing from modern-day Namibia) brought suit in the Southern District of New York against the Federal Republic of Germany. 19
The suit alleged, inter alia, that Germany was responsible for geno-

156. Id.
157. Id. at 1426.
158. There are questions of sovereign immunity regarding this case that this Note will
not address-namely whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ('FSIA"). For the purposes of this
Note's argument, it is assumed that any issues of sovereign immunity regarding the FSIA
have been overcome. While the district court that considered this case held that the plaintiffs
were unable to overcome the FSIAbarriers and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rukoro v. Federal Republic of Germany, 363 F. Supp. 3d 436, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), an
appeal of that decision has been filed as of this writing, Rukoro v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 19-609 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2019).
159. See Rukoro I,363 F. Supp. 3d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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cidal activities during the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. 160 Amongst their arguments for jurisdiction, the plaintiffs asserted the court could hear the case under the ATS. 16 1 This was not the
first attempt by the Ovaherero and Nama peoples, who had previously
been unsuccessful in attempting to bring action against Germany in
the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other U.S. courts. 16 2 While the

judge in the Southern District did not immediately dismiss the suit, as
opposed to the prior cases, she ultimately did grant the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 63
Under the current interpretation of the ATS-and owing to sovereign immunity issues-it was arguably inevitable that this case would
be dismissed. Had the plaintiffs overcome the sovereign immunity issues, they would have eventually run headlong into the presumption
against extraterritoriality from Kiobel, a presumption the court would
have likely found impossible for the plaintiffs to overcome. 16 4 Because
the events in question took place entirely overseas, 161 the plaintiffs
would have been forced to show some connection to the United States.
While the alleged actions, that is, genocide or attempt to commit genocide, do consist of a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of customary international law, 16 6 nonetheless the presumption would have
almost certainly rendered this claim dead on arrival.
However, assuming the plaintiffs overcame any issues of sovereign
immunity and the court then analyzed the ATS using the hybrid approach (rather than the Kiobel and Jesner interpretations), the first
question would be whether there is a violation of a clear norm of customary international law. As noted above, genocide is a recognized
norm of customary international law. 167 Thus, the initial inquiry for
Justice Sotomayor's test is satisfied. It is at prong two where there is

160. Id. at 441.
161. Id. at 443.
162. Felicia Stephan, The First Genocide of the 20th Century Before a Domestic Court,
VOLKERRECHTSBLOG (May 28, 2018), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-first-genocide-of-the20th-century-before-a-domestic-court/.
163. See Rukoro I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 452.
164. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 118 (2013) ("[T]o rebut the presumption [against extraterritoriality], the ATS would need to evince a 'clear indication of
extraterritoriality.' It does not.") (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265
(2010) (citation omitted); see also id. at 124-25 ("And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.").
165. See Rukoro I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 441-42.
166. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004); see also Kadic v. Karadi6,
70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding sufficient consensus existed that genocide violated
international law).
167. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
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a divergence between the current ATS interpretation and the proposed
hybrid test.
The question of whether this is the kind of violation U.S. courts
have an interest in enforcing is trickier than whether the violation is
a clear norm of customary international law. While the United States
has a clear interest in condemning genocide on the macro level, 16 8 this
case would still seem to fail Justice Breyer's distinct American interests test. 169 The alleged torts did not occur on American soil, 170 the
plaintiffs are largely not American citizens (although some are),171 and
it is hard to say that the defendant's conduct substantially affected a
distinct American interest, 17 2 not least because these actions allegedly
occurred between 1885-1909.173 Critically, in the complaint there are
extremely limited American interests implicated by the alleged actions
of the defendants. 17 4 Thus, this case would seem to fail the second
prong of the hybrid approach, viz, enforcing this recognized norm of
customary international law would arguably be an abuse of the court's
discretion because it does not concern a distinct enough American interest.
A counterargument in favor of this passing the second prong, however, is what one could almost term the "residual clause" of Justice
168. See, e.g., id. (citing Statement of Interest of the United States at 5-13) (stating the
government's position that private persons may be found liable for acts of genocide, war
crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law).
169. There is, however, a rebuttal argument that this would satisfy Justice Breyer's test
since "[n]othing in the [text of the ATS] or its history suggest that our courts should turn a
blind eye to the plight of victims in that 'handful of heinous actions."' Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 133
(Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). Because the "language, history, and purpose[] [of the
ATS] suggest [it] was to be a weapon in the 'war' against those modern pirates who, by their
conduct, have 'declared war against all mankind[,]" there is a powerful argument in favor of
finding jurisdiction under the ATS given the heinous nature of the alleged actions. Id. at
133-34 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67, *72). However, because of the
distinct lack of any connection to the United States, this Note proceeds under the theory that
even given Justice Breyer's broader interpretation of jurisdiction under the ATS, the plaintiffs in this case would still have failed had the case not been dismissed on other grounds.
See Rukoro I,363 F. Supp. 3d at 452.
170. See Rukoro I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 441-42.
171. Id.
172. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 139 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he jurisdictional approach
that I would use is . .. insisten[t] upon the presence of some distinct American interest," and
is "consistent with the substantive view of the statute that we took in Sosa. This approach
would avoid placing the statute's jurisdictional scope at odds with its substantive objectives,
holding out the word of promise of compensation for victims of the torturer, while breaking
it to the hope.") (internal quotations omitted).
173. Rukoro I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 441-42.
174. See id. at 442-43 (invoking American interests in the context of human remains and
records of the genocide that are allegedly currently in the possession of American museums
as well as four real estate properties that funds derived from the genocide were allegedly
used to purchase).
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Breyer's concurrence, where he mentions the importance of making
sure the United States does not become a safe harbor for a torturer or
enemy of mankind.1 7 5 Justice Breyer viewed the ATS as a means to
ensure those individuals who have violated norms of customary international law cannot flee to the United States to avoid liability
abroad. 176
However, because this action is being brought against the Federal
Republic of Germany and not any one individual,1 7 7 this safe harbor
provision would seem to also fail. There are by and large no allegations
made against any specific individuals, or allegations that the United
States is harboring tortfeasors liable for genocide. 17 8 Thus, dismissing
this case for lack of jurisdiction would seem proper because there is no
distinct American interest and allowing it to continue forward runs
the risk of creating the perverse safe harbor Justice Breyer warned
about.
B.

The Case of JamalKhashoggi7

9

A case that is more in line with vindicating American interests is
that of Jamal Khashoggi. Mr. Khashoggi was a Saudi Arabian national
living in the United States on an "0" visa and employed as a journalist
at the Washington Post.18 0 On October 2, 2018, Mr. Khashoggi disappeared after entering a Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. 181 On October 19, 2018, Saudi state media officially acknowledged Mr.
Khashoggi's death, blaming it on a fight inside the Turkish consulate. 1 8 2 This Note posits that using the hybrid test, the survivors of Mr.
Khashoggi could attempt to recover damages against the foreign Saudi
individuals responsible under the ATS.
As with the case of the Ovaherero and Nama peoples, this case
would have little chance under the current interpretation of the ATS.
175. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying
note 129.
176. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 138-39.
177. Rukoro I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 436.
178. See id. at 441-43. The only specific individuals referenced are German military and
government officials, with the exception of a German anthropologist named Felix von Luschan. Id.
179. As with the case of the Ovaherero and Nama peoples, there are sovereign immunity
issues implicated in the case of Mr. Khashoggi. As before, these will not be addressed, and
this Note assumes any issues of sovereign immunity, viz, those relating to the FSIA, are
overcome for the purposes of any potential claim brought under the ATS.
180. Heather Timmons, What Does the US Owe Jamal Khashoggi?, QUARTZ (Oct. 19,
2018), https://qz.com/1428499/j amal-khashoggi-what-trump-owes-khashoggi-under-us-lawand-constitution/.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Setting aside sovereign immunity issues, the presumption against extraterritoriality would almost certainly spell doom for any claim
brought by Mr. Khashoggi's survivors. 183
However, under the hybrid approach, there are many factors weighing in favor of finding a distinct American interest. Mr. Khashoggi was
a resident of the United States, three of his children are United States
citizens and it is believed Mr. Khashoggi himself was applying for permanent residency in the United States through the green card program. 1 8 4 Further, Mr. Khashoggi was a well-known critic of the Saudi
regime.1 85 By allowing those responsible for the death of a U.S resident-ostensibly killed because of his criticism of a foreign power-to
escape liability, the United States risks allowing its shores to become
a safe haven for torturers and enemies of mankind.1 8 6 As such, in reverse order this would seem to satisfy the second prong of the hybrid
test by concerning a distinct American interest.
The threshold question is whether Mr. Khashoggi's murder qualifies as a violation of a norm of customary international law. It does:
torture is unequivocally a jus cogens norm. 1 87 There is then the question of whether enforcing this is in line with American interests and
norms. This is also answered in the affirmative as the Supreme Court
has held, presumption against extraterritoriality notwithstanding,
U.S. courts have an interest in vindicating violations committed by the
modern-day equivalents of pirates.1 8 8 Thus, the case of Mr. Khashoggi
would seem to pass the hybrid test. This and the case of the Ovaherero
and Nama peoples show the hybrid test is not only more flexible than

183. See supra Part VII.A.
184. See Timmons supra note 175; see also John Haltiwanger, Killed JournalistJamal
Khashoggi's Children, Some of Whom Are Dual US Citizens, Are Reportedly Barredfrom
Leaving
Saudi
Arabia,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Oct.
24,
2018),
https://
www.businessinsider.com/khashoggis-children-are-reportedly-barred-from-leaving-saudiarabia-2018-10.
185. JamalKhashoggi;All You Need to Know About Saudi Journalist'sDeath, BBC.coM
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45812399; Khashoggi: Saudi Arabia Can Never Be a Democracy 'on MBS Watch', AL JAZEERA (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/khashoggi-saudi-arabia-democracy-mbs-watch18032310354317 1.html.
186. There is arguably an even greater American interest implicated given Mr.
Khashoggi's death seemingly came about due to the exercise of his First Amendment rights
to free speech. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2.
187. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
188 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 121 (2013) (holding that
"[p]irates were fair game wherever found, by any nation, because they generally did not operation within any jurisdiction.").
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the Court's current ATS construction, but that it is applicable to the
modern issues confronting U.S. courts.189
VIII. CONCLUSION

The ATS was almost entirely dormant from the time it was enacted
in 1789 until nearly two hundred years later, when it was reinvigorated with the case of Filartigain 1980. In the subsequent four decades,
the ATS has undergone drastic shifts in its utility and interpretation.
With the Court's recent decisions in Kiobel and Jesner, the viability of
the ATS for litigating human rights violations has diminished drastically. The Court has held the ATS cannot be applied to foreign corporate defendants and that it is also subject to the presumption against
extraterritoriality. This means the ATS is virtually off-limits for conduct outside the United States and would rarely be invokable against
a foreign defendant unless he committed a tort against another alien
within the borders of the United States. These narrow views of the
ATS have effectively rendered it, to use the language of Sosa, stillborn.190

This Note argued the Court's recent interpretations of the ATS are
flawed. The Sosa Court envisioned potential new causes of action arising under the ATS, and yet subsequent cases heard by the Court have
seemingly foreclosed any possibility of such an option. This Note contended that the Court should return to the principles laid down in Sosa
using Justice Breyer's concurrence in Kiobel and Justice Sotomayor's
dissent in Jesner. By relying on norms of international law to inform
courts of whether a norm is definite enough to be considered viable
under the ATS but enforcing new causes of action only where there is
a distinct American interest, the ATS can be appropriately narrowed
while also allowing for redress of torts committed by modern day pirates (e.g., terrorists, torturers, perpetrators of genocide).
This Note also showed how this hybrid test is applicable to modern
problems facing U.S. courts, as seen in the ongoing case of the Ovaherero and Nama peoples of Namibia against the government of Germany, as well as hypothetical future litigation by the survivors of
189. There is some evidence that while the Supreme Court seems intractable on the ATS,
some lower courts are moving towards adopting a more flexible standard such as the one
proposed by this Note. See, e.g., Jane W. v. Thomas, 354 F. Supp. 3d 630, 639 (E.D. Penn.
Dec. 14, 2018) ("[T]he [c]ourt [in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss] concludes that
Plaintiffs' ATS claims touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace
the general presumption against jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims . . . . Based on these
pleadings, the [c]ourt concludes that jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' ATS claims are proper under
the Kiobel standard.").
190. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1437-38 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Jamal Khashoggi against Saudi Arabian officials. While the plaintiffs
in those cases would likely face insurmountable obstacles in bringing
their claims for relief in both their own domestic courts and the foreign
courts of the defendants, the ATS could and should serve as a vehicle
for such tort victims to seek redress, even if a potential victory is purely
symbolic in nature. If America wishes to be the shining city upon a
hill, 191 its courts must set an example and serve as forums where aliens
can find justice.

191. See Matthew 5:14 (King James) ('A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid."); see also
President-Elect John F. Kennedy, Address to Joint Session of the Mass. Legislature (Jan. 9,
1961) ("That we shall be as a city upon a hill-the eyes of all people are upon us. Today the
eyes of all people are truly upon us."); President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to American People (Jan. 11, 1989) ("I've spoken of the shining city all my political life, . . . in my
mind, it was a tall proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind swept [sic], God
blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace-a city with free
ports that hummed with commerce and creativity, and if there had to be city walls, the walls
had doors, and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here.") (emphasis added); Then-Senator Barack Obama, University of Mass. at Bos. Commencement
Address (June 2, 2006) ("As the earliest settlers arrived [in America], they dreamed of building a City upon a Hill. . . . I see students . . . believing like those first settlers that they too
could find a home in this City on a Hill-that they too could find success in this unlikeliest
of places.").

